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CCN - 1970 Operations (Partial Draft)

We are trying to collect copies of all awards for personnel earned while participating in/supporting MACVSOG Operations. If you have orders/awards/documents which can add to the information shown, please send copies by snail mail to 2314 Cheshire Lane, Houston, TX 77018. (PLEASE DO NOT EMAIL!!!) Use the following table to help identify operations and provide your comments as thread in the appropriate forum noted:

As I pull awards, I may be able to ID and provide more details for some of these operations. The concept is that all operations are given a number indicating CCS, CCC, CCN and the year; reporting period, sequential number, type of element [RT (Recon Team), HT (Halo Team), ST (STRATA Team, NOT Spike Team), SF (Security Force), HF (Hatchet Force), AT (ARVN-led RT), AP (ARVN-led Platoon), BL (Bright Light), WC (WACO CITY)] and an identifier, if known. In the discussion/forum, you can add threads to the Reporting period, reference the operation identification number.

Reconnaissance Information

Information collected by SOG forces was reported to the intelligence community by several means.

1. While the team was still in the field, important information was reported to a FAC or radio relay site, who further relayed it to a C&C detachment. The C&C detachment then issued a Spot Report with the information to Headquarters, SOG, and the Field Force concerned.

2. When a team returned, an Advanced Intelligence Report was filed immediately. A detailed After-Action-Report followed the thorough debriefing of the team. These reports were forwarded to MACSOG-20 for further dissemination to MACV J2 and the US intelligence community in the form of Intelligence Reports.

1970 SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

General

Periodic wrap-up briefings were presented to COMUSMACV and key members of his staff throughout the year which summarized MACSOG’s activities. The briefings included detailed presentations of operations and served to keep COMUSMACV fully cognizant of SOG’s capabilities, limitations, restrictions, and accomplishments. Resumes of the briefing highlights follow which represent a chronological summary of MACSOG operations during 1970. Although reconnaissance teams (RTs) were assigned specific target areas within or near a given base area (BA), only the general BAs are referred to in summarizing the operations (Figure 5).

Wrap-Up: 1-14 January [CCN70-01]

Northern PFAO

In the northern half of the PFAO, weather limited operations, and only two teams were able to get on the ground. One RT [CCN70-01-01-RT ??] was inserted on 13 January and extracted on the 14th after contact with an unknown size enemy element. Another team was launched from Quang Tri, [CCN70-01-02-RT ??] but a FAC found the target area saturated with enemy personnel and the team was diverted back to the mission launch site. TAC AIR was employed, but the exact enemy casualties could not be determined due to rapidly deteriorating weather.

Wrap-Up: 15 January-4 February [CCN70-02]

BA 614

Northwest of BA 614, a STRATA team [CCN70-02-01-ST ??] was inserted on 23 January. On the 25th, the team sighted a small enemy force and became split. Three of the six team members were extracted; the others were listed as MIA.

BA 607

Three teams west of the base area confronted unknown size enemy forces and were extracted under fire. Another RT [CCN70-02-05-RT ??] was able to conduct a 10 minute wire-tap before making contact with an estimated platoon. The team was extracted under fire, and the tape was released to the 8th Radio Research Group (8RRG) at Phu Bai.

The northern portion of the PFAO continued to be a center of high enemy activity. Nine teams operating in this area were beset with platoon size elements and one team encountered an estimated company after discovering a 30 bunker complex. The enemy’s anti-commando activity kept RT stay times to less than 2½ days in their respective target areas.

One team [CCN70-02-14-RT ??] was able to complete a wire-tap on a six wire multiplex system before being compromised. Unfortunately the wire-tap devices could only record up to 10 kilohertz band width, and the enemies system in this case was about 35 kilohertz band width. Only a very limited signal could be picked up, but the tap was forwarded thru RR channels.

Wrap-Up: 5-25 February [CCN70-03]

BA 614

Two STRATA teams were descended on by estimated platoons and extracted under ground fire. Two RTs were compromised shortly after insert by unknown size enemy forces and extracted.

BA 607

An RT [CCN70-03-05-RT ??] conducted a wire-tap on a wire that was attached to overhead poles and trees by glass insulators. The team tapped the wire for an hour and a half; tapes were forwarded to the 8th RRG at Phu Bai for evaluation.

Approximately 30 enemy armed with AK-47s compromised one team [CCN70-03-06-RT CT?] on the third day of their mission, but weather prevented a quick extraction. The enemy jammed the teams FM radio after making contact; radio contact was reestablished on an alternate frequency, and TAC AIR was directed on the enemy positions. One machine gun was destroyed and there was one secondary explosion. On the fourth night, the team leader called in C-119 gunships to within 15 meters of his position by using a mini-ponder transmitter which positioned the team on the aircraft radar. Screams and cries from the enemy were heard throughout the night. The weather broke the next morning, and the team was extracted under cover of TAC AIR.

BA 611

An RT [CCN70-03-07-RT ??] was extracted on the second day of its point reconnaissance mission after being compromised by trackers. Two other teams spent a total of 14 days in one target area. The first RT [CCN70-03-08-RT ??] inserted on 6 February to conduct a wire-tap and was extracted 8 days later without incident. The second team, ARVN-led, [CCN70-03-09-AT ??] was inserted as the first was extracted. The team was extracted when three SCU became ill.

An ARVN-led team [CCN70-03-10-AT ??] was inserted on 15 February and extracted on 19 February after two team members became ill. Another RT [CCN70-03-11-RT ??] was inserted on the 24th with the mission of roadwatch on Highway 9218. It was extracted on 26 February after making contact with an unknown size enemy force.

In Laos, one team [CCN70-03-12-RT IN?] came under attack by an estimated platoon necessitating its extraction on the second day of the mission. North of BA 611, two teams [CCN70-03-13-RT ??], [CCN70-03-14-RT ??] launched together on 17 February were inserted on separate LZs. Collateral sources, however, reported that the enemy had seen the insert and both teams were extracted the same day.

Wrap-Up: 25 February-18 March [CCN70-04]

BA 614

In the base area, an RT [CCN70-04-01-RT ??] was active for six days before being extracted, reporting no activity. Northeast of the BA, two RT’s [CCN70-04-02-RT ??], [CCN70-04-03-RT ??] made contact with an estimated two platoons resulting in 3 NVA/VC KIA and 5 NVA/VC WIA. This heavy contact plus FAC reports of ground activity indicated that BA 614 and surrounding area was a probable logistical base and staging area.

BAs 607/611

An RT [CCN70-04-04-RT AN?] was inserted in BA 607 on 13 March, but was compromised by an undetermined size force and extracted the same day. Southwest of the area, a STRATA team reported no enemy activity.

In the southern portion of BA 611, one RT [CCN70-04-05-RT ??] contacted an estimated two squads of enemy and was extracted on 5 March. Another team [CCN70-04-06-RT ??] was compromised by an estimated platoon and extracted on the same day of insertion. A STRATA team [CCN70-04-07-ST ??] was separated after contact with an unknown size force on 19 March; three team members were extracted on the 20th reporting that the other 3 were KIA.

North of BA 611, two teams spent 11 days on the ground. The first team [CCN70-04-08-RT ??] discovered a cache of five 140mm rockets. When it was extracted on 13 March, the second team [CCN70-04-09-RT AN?] was inserted to destroy the cache and continue the mission of area reconnaissance. This team was extracted on 16 March after a SCU stepped on an M-14 mine. On 13 March, another team [CCN70-04-10-RT ??] discovered a camouflaged communications/liaison station containing 10 hootches. TAC AIR was directed against the area and dense. black smoke indicated that the strike hit some type of fuel storage. This area was also believed to be a troop infiltration route between the DMZ and the Khe Sanh area. Two other elements [CCN70-04-11-RT ??], [CCN70-04-12-RT ??] were beset with an unknown size enemy force and were lifted out shortly after insertion.

DMZ

One team [CCN70-04-13-RT ??] reported numerous enemy sightings during nine days in its operational area, and discovered a total of 29 rounds of 82mm mortar ammo stacked near a suspected firing position on 27 February. Enemy security precluded destruction of the cache. This team was extracted on 5 March and another team was inserted. The second team [CCN70-04-14-RT ??] was extracted on 9 March after being compromised. Another flip-flop operation was a roadwatch mission [CCN70-04-15-RT ??] and terminated on 13 March after 4 SCU became ill.

The radio relay site north of Khe Sanh continued to provide an exceptionally useful means of maintaining contact with teams operating west of the DMZ. Seven US and 35 SCU were normally on top of the hill armed with two 4.2 mortars, a 57mm recoilless rifle and machine guns. They were capable of directing the fires of 175mm from a fire base to the east. Despite difficulties in resupply the risk and hazards to the personnel were offset by the advantages of having a radio relay site capable of monitoring team activity with secure voice 24 hours a day.

Wrap-Up: 19 March-1 April [CCN70-05]

BA 607

In BA 607, three RTs and a STRATA team were active. In one target area a team [CCN70-05-01-RT BM?] reporting contact with an estimated company shortly after insert on 20 March, but weather precluded extraction of the team until the 24th. While supporting the teams movement to an LZ, a Marine UH1E gunship was hit by enemy ground fire and crashed killing all aboard. Two other RTs [CCN70-05-02-RT ??] made contact with an estimated platoon and were subsequently extracted. [CCN70-05-03-RT ??]

BA 611

In the Laotian salient, a STRATA team [CCN70-05-04-ST ??]made contact with a company size unit on 18 March resulting in one team member MIA. North of BA 611, a team [CCN70-05-05-RT ??] located and destroyed a cache of 140mm rockets previously located by another RT. They also discovered, an elaborately constructed and recently used bunker complex that contained six large bunkers with interspersed foxholes, and commanded an excellent view over Route 925.

North of BA 611, an RT [CCN70-05-06-RT ??]conducted a successful wire-tap of enemy wire traffic. After recording for 15 minutes, the team severed the wire, secured a cross piece with insulators and wire attached, and moved to an LZ for extraction.

Wrap-Up: 2-22 April [CCN70-06]

BA 614

In BA 614, three out of five RTs were extracted after contact with enemy elements. One platoon (4 US and 35 SCU) [CCN70-06-04-HF B Co?] also established a mobile patrol base along the Laotian border on 17 April. On 21 April, the PB engaged an estimated platoon resulting in one SCU KIA.

BA 607

On 9 April, a pen flare from the ground was sighted near an insertion LZ. [CCN70-06-05-RT ??] It was a signal from the co-pilot of a Marine AH-1G Cobra gunship that had crashed on 21 March while supporting another SOG element in this area. When picked up, the co-pilot stated that he had been thrown clear of the aircraft as it crashed and that the pilot was KIA. The co-pilot was taken to the 85th EVAC at Quang Tri where he was treated for malnutrition and injuries suffered in the crash.

BA 611

Information from a team [CCN70-06-06-RT ??] on a riverwatch mission south of BA 611, indicated the Xe Sap River was not being used as an infiltration route. Inside the area, four ARVN teams were continually in contact with enemy elements. North of BA 611, nine reconnaissance elements engaged enemy elements. A team from NKP [CCN70-06-19-RT ??] met an NVA squad shortly after insert, and one of the wounded enemy surrendered to the team as a POW. He stated that he was an LZ watcher and had notified a squad of eight Laotians that the RT had landed in the area. The POW and several Laotians were wounded by claymore fragments during contact; the POW surrendered when his friends withdrew leaving him to die.

From the preliminary interrogation of the POW it was learned that the prisoner was a 29 year old NVA Lieutenant named Tran Dinh Thang. While in NVN, he had been chief of an ordnance sub-section, rear service section, 27th Regiment, B-5 Front. In early February 1970, he was assigned to a twelve man civilian proselyting team to organize and train the local inhabitants in Western Quang Tn Province. After arriving in the target area, the team members separated, moved to their assigned areas, and were not in contact with each other thereafter. He lived and worked with the mountain tribes in Laos and Western Quang In Province where he helped the local inhabitants increase food production and organize an area defense force. He stated that the 27th Regiment operated out of the central DMZ area with the mission of attacking allied forces and interdicting Route 9. He also indicated that the 3rd Bn, 27th NVA Regiment was located in Western Quang In Province.

West DMZ/DMZ

West of the DMZ an RT [CCN70-06-20-RT ??] was active for two days before making contact with an estimated enemy platoon. In the DMZ, two RTs [CCN70-06-21-RT ??], [CCN70-06-22-RT ??] were extracted after compromise by an estimated two enemy squads. A third team [CCN70-06-23-RT ??] remained active.

Wrap-Up: 23 April-6 May [CCN70-07]

BA 614

A STRATA team [CCN70-07-01-ST ??] reported no significant enemy activity during an 11 day mission. A platoon size patrol base [CCN70-07-02-HF ??] launched three teams into target areas and combated an estimated platoon; one SCU was WIA and three enemy KIA. One of the PB RTs [CCN70-07-03-RT Plank?] was extracted on the eleventh day of its operation after contact with a possible Pathet Lao squad. The enemy wore blue-gray uniforms and were armed with AK-47s and one Soviet 7.62 PPS 1943 sub-machine gun.

BA 611

South of BA 611, four RTs were extracted after compromise. A fifth team [CCN70-07-10-RT ??] recovered the remains of a helicopter pilot from a chopper that crashed on 21 March while supporting a SOG operation. North of BA 611, two RTs [CCN70-07-11-RT ??], [CCN70-07-12-RT ??] were affronted by NVA squad size elements and subsequently extracted. A STRATA team [CCN70-07-13-ST ??] continued to report negative enemy activity.

Wrap-Up: 7-27 May [CCN70-08]

BA614

Two STRATA teams spent a total of 22 days in the AO. One team [CCN70-08-01-ST ??] completed its mission; the second [CCN70-08-02-ST ??] was extracted after contact with an unknown size enemy force. One RT [CCN70-08-03-RT ??] was also extracted after enemy contact.

BA 611

South of the BA, one RT [CCN70-08-04-RT ??] was in almost constant contact with enemy elements for three days. Then the team was ambushed by an estimated ten NVA armed with AK-47s and rocket launchers on 15 May. There were only light casualties and the team was extracted without incident after a day’s weather delay. North of BA 611, an ARVN RT [CCN70-08-05-AT ??] completed a seven day mission, and three other teams encountered NVA forces necessitating extraction.

DMZ

Two RTs [CCN70-08-09-RT ??], [CCN70-08-10-RT ??] observed and heard truck traffic moving west on a suspected east-west road. This traffic was probably carrying supplies into Laos for subsequent transshipment across Laos into SVN. Other sources also reported that the number of transportation elements in the DMZ area had increased.

Wrap-Up: 28 May-10 June [CCN70-09]

BA 607

Southwest of BA 607 four teams were inserted from a new radio relay site. The teams reported extensive agricultural activity, groups of well-armed enemy, increased trail activity, and suspected communications liaison or way stations. One RT [CCN70-09-01-RT ??] discovered six recently used bamboo houses containing normal household equipment and several NVA khaki uniforms. The team also observed 58 enemy dressed in khaki shorts and long sleeved shirts armed with AK-47s, B-40s and RPDs. They were moving in groups of 8-10.

Photographs taken in the area indicated wood chips were used to make trails more trafficable during the rainy season. Hootches were permanent and well constructed with thatch roofs supported by 10 to 12 foot steel beams.

BA 611

North of BA 611, a team [CCN70-09-05-RT MT?] ambushed three enemy on 31 May; two were killed, and a wounded POW died enroute to the hospital. The team [CCN70-09-06-RT ?Thomas/MT?] was reinserted in the same target area on 6 June. On the 8th the team ambushed four enemy; again all but one enemy were killed, and the wounded prisoner died of wounds. The team did, however, recover documents that identified these enemy as part of a road maintenance crew.

In another target area an RT [CCN70-09-07-RT ??] was shot out of its LZ on 1 June and re-inserted the next day. [CCN70-09-08-RT ??] They engaged enemy units on two occasions. In the second engagement, three NVA were KIA; a wounded captured NVA died of wounds in the 18th Surgical Hospital. The team also observed a communications liaison or way station overlooking Route 1032B. The enemy units encountered were believed to be part of the security elements of this complex.

DMZ

In the DMZ one team [CCN70-09-09-RT ??] was active for seven days and reported no significant information. Another RT [CCN70-09-10-RT ??] was engaged by an enemy squad and was extracted under light ground fire. Results of SOG team activity west of the DMZ continued to confirm large numbers of enemy troops in this area. SOG and 7th Air Force FACs continued to report large concentrations of POL barrels floating in the river networks of the northern PFAO. From 1 April to 10 June, approximately 10,000 barrels were counted.

Since the middle of May, SOG covey riders from NKP reported extensive and rapid road construction along Route 1032B from the western edge of the DMZ south to Route 925. Bulldozers widened the road to 30 feet and fording sites were improved with crushed rock. Bunkers and shelters were constructed in the banks of the road. Aircraft also reported an increase in 14.5 and 12.7 millimeter anti-aircraft fire. SOG FACs noticed a peculiar ten foot high fence running down the center of Route 1032B that was constructed of bamboo and elephant grass. Close-up photography indicated that the fence was well maintained and that it camouflaged the size of the road by causing shadows and blending in with the surrounding vegetation. A photograph taken on 5 June showed the end of the fence, several roadside bunkers, and a drive-in bunker under a large earth mound. The entrance of the bunker was shored much like that of a mine shaft entrance and was 8-10 feet high. A turn around point with vehicle tracks was evident at the entrance.

Wrap-Up: 10 June-7 July [CCN70-10]

BA 607

Southwest of BA 607 two teams [CCN70-10-01-RT ??] walked from the SUGAR LOAF radio relay site. Both teams encountered severe electrical storms and returned to SUGAR LOAF because the Montagnard team members were firmly convinced that evil omens had beset the operation; one team [CCN70-10-02-RT ??] had three members wounded by wood splinters when lighting struck their location.

BA 611

North of BA 611, a US sniper team [CCN70-10-03-RT ?Cunning/AK?] located a recently used AAA position with approximately 200 expended 12.7m casings. On 13 June, the team engaged two enemy squads supported by 60m mortar. The enemy force used fire and maneuver and was heard to call instructions to capture one of the team members. The team was extracted without further incident. A STRATA team [CCN70-10-04-ST ??] was inserted on 12 June from NKP, encountered an enemy platoon, and evaded with no casualties. On 17 June, the team located a battalion size base camp that had been unused for about three months. On 18 June, 30 men, women and children were seen planting rice and corn. While under the teams observation, the laborers were warned of approaching aircraft by signal shots at which time all work ceased. The team was extracted on 19 June.

DMZ

West and southwest of the DMZ, teams reported frequent contacts. The enemy patrolled the area extensively with squad size elements. A STRATA team [CCN70-10-05-ST ??] reported several trucks moving on Route 10328. Additionally, heavy road equipment operated almost continuously during their nine days in the area. The team had five confrontations with enemy forces and was extracted under light ground fire on 27 June. Another STRATA team [CCN70-10-06-RT ??] reported light enemy activity in another area and was extracted without incident on 28 June. A US team [CCN70-10-07-RT ??] was extracted under emergency conditions after having been surrounded by a superior enemy force that attempted to induce the team into surrendering. Several enemy were shouting in English. Five teams were extracted under heavy fire after combating unknown size enemy elements. A trailwatch team [CCN70-10-12-RT BM?] heard extensive bulldozer activity and several trucks on Route 1032B from 21 to 23 June. The team was compromised on 24 June and extracted under light ground fire.

On 30 June, an OV-10 aircraft from NKP was flying a visual reconnaissance mission to locate landing zones west of the DMZ and was downed by enemy AAA. The covey rider bailed out at 300 feet and was recovered with minor injuries. [CCN70-10-13-OO ?Duffy?] During the SAR effort however, an Air Force CH-53 helicopter was downed by AAA fire that exploded and ripped off the left side of the aircraft. The CH-53 inverted and exploded on impact. Crew members were listed as MIA.

An ARVN team [CCN70-10-14-RT ??] successfully evaded an unknown size enemy force in the DMZ and continued to note extensive activity. On 22 June a US RT [CCN70-10-14-RT ??] was inserted in the same area and reported that it was surrounded by enemy forces the next day. The team was extracted under heavy ground fire. Twenty enemy were killed by helicopter gunships supporting the extraction. On 27 June another US team [CCN70-10-15-RT ?Mosiello?] was inserted and engaged forces the next two days. The team was extracted on 30 June under light ground fire.

An ARVN team [CCN70-10-16-RT ??] made contact on 12 June and was extracted the next day. On 21 June, a US team [CCN70-10-17-RT ??] in this same area was surrounded. C-119 gunships expended on suspected locations and the team evaded until 22 June when they were extracted under light ground fire. In a third target area a US team [CCN70-10-18-RT ?Dressler?] reported hearing several trucks moving north to south during the evening of 21 June. During their three days in the area several explosions were heard in groups of two and three along Route 1032B. On 22 June, the team was attacked by about 70 VC/NVA, and was extracted under heavy gunfire.

The enemy reacted very aggressively during this period to reconnaissance activities in the DMZ and the area in Laos west and southwest of the DMZ. This strong reaction was evidenced by the large number of enemy encountered, the proliferation of tracking elements, extensive AAA fire received by air assets, and by the use of mortars to probe and attack SOG reconnaissance teams. Two conclusions were drawn from the enemy’s apparent over-reactions, either the enemy had moved into the western portions of the DMZ in strength, or the enemy possibly believed that increased activities, which included many false insertions and extractions, were a prelude to future larger scale military operations into his Laotian and DMZ sanctuaries. In either event the enemy was laboriously improving Route 1032 southwest from North Vietnam and skirting the western portion of the DMZ. Evidence of this activity was noted by numerous FAC and RT reports. RTs heard numerous explosions indicating probable road construction and also heard continuous nocturnal bulldozer activity and occasional truck movement. Several visual observations were made of actual working parties on this route. Building and maintenance efforts on Route 1032 strongly suggested that it would be a major infiltration supply route to the south.

Wrap-Up: 8 July-19 August [CCN70-11]

SUGAR LOAF

Near the SUGAR LOAF radio relay site, a US team [CCN70-11-01-RT ??] attempted a POW capture by the deception technique of declaring a false emergency and simulated extraction under fire. The team was in ambush to engage any enemy that would investigate the area after the mock battle. The ruse worked too well; a large enemy force swept the area and in fact surrounded the ambushing force. The team was extracted under heavy fire.

On 14 August, a point reconnaissance team [CCN70-11-02-RT KS?] was engaged by an unknown size enemy force. Three members of the team were wounded and the team declared a PF emergency. A BRIGHT LIGHT team [CCN70-11-03-BL ?Coehlo?] was inserted to assist the team during the attempted extraction. Two UH-1 helos crashed, and, during a subsequent extraction attempt, another UH-1 crashed when its ladder became entangled in a tree. Total casualties were three US and two SCU KIA and six US and five SCU WIA. Three helos were destroyed, two of which were lost to ground fire. Further insertions by helicopter were suspended in this area pending a re-evaluation of the enemy threat.

DMZ

West and southwest of the DMZ, 18 teams were active. Teams were targeted on roadwatch missions to monitor logistics activities on the Route 1032B complex and almost every team made contact with enemy forces. On three occasions the enemy was heard to shout instructions in English. In the western portion of the DMZ, all teams made contact with enemy forces. In the eastern portion of the DMZ AO, there was a distinct lack of enemy activity. With increased activity in the western areas, it was assumed that the enemy had geared his security forces to counter small reconnaissance team operations. As a result SOG began development of new techniques for insertion of team assets which included parachute operations with standard and high altitude drops.

Wrap-Up: 20 August-11 September [CCN70-12]

SUGAR LOAF

Near the SUGAR LOAF radio relay site, one team [CCN70-12-01-RT ??] encountered approximately twelve enemy troops, and a second team [CCN70-12-02-RT ??] reported no activity. On 30 August an OV-10 aircraft flying a VR mission crashed 500 meters north of the site. A BRIGHT LIGHT team [CCN70-12-03-BL ??] was immediately dispatched from the site and recovered the bodies of the two crew members. Cause of the crash was undetermined.

DMZ

In the area west and south of the DMZ a team on an area recon mission [CCN70-12-04-RT ?Crawford?] discovered two ammo caches near Route 9. One cache contained 100 to 200 rounds of 60mm and 81mm mortar rounds; the other cache had approximately 250 rounds of 7.62mm and 12.7mm ammo. The caches appeared to have been partially destroyed by airstrikes. On 25 August, the team engaged an unknown size enemy force and called in helicopter gunships; five enemy troops were KBA. Route 9 was not being used, but it was in good condition and could support heavy traffic with only a little improvement.

An ARVN-led team [CCN70-12-05-RT ??] encountered a possible North Vietnamese, Pathet Lao platoon-sized element, and received B-40 rocket fire and mortar rounds. The immediate and persistent pursuit of the recon team indicated a continued high enemy counter-reconnaissance effort in this area.

Recent FAC debriefs and results of several VR missions indicated that heavy rains significantly damaged the motorable routes and trails in the DMZ. Route 1032 had several large wash-out areas and there were deep ruts where heavy trucks attempted to traverse the route. However, engineer crews were continually repairing the damaged areas, and the route was able to sustain wheeled vehicle traffic.

Wrap-Up: 12-23 September [CCN70-13]

BA 607

On 14 September a team [CCN70-13-01-RT ?Durham?] was extracted under heavy ground fire from a target area west of BA 607. One UH-1H helicopter was shot down and destroyed. During their mission, the team observed the confluence of the Xe Sap, Xe Kong and Xe Ron and estimated that the junction was not navigable by boats due to rapids, large boulders and sand bars. Another team [CCN70-13-02-RT ??] also reported that the Xe Ron and Dak Polly Rivers were not navigable. The team did observe a cable suspended across the Xe Ron, and numerous cultivated fields were observed along the banks of both rivers. Team sightings and VR missions consistently verified agricultural activity in this area.

BA 611

North of BA 611, three enemy carrying AK-47s were sighted on a trail: two were dressed in brown shirts; the third was wearing a blue shirt and carrying a white bag. The team [CCN70-13-03-RT ??] attempted to capture a POW, but all three enemy fled and a search of the area produced negative results. A second team [CCN70-13-04-RT ??] was extracted after compromise by an enemy squad. On 22 September, a third insertion [CCN70-13-05-RT ??] was aborted when the lead helicopter received intense ground fire from both the primary and alternate LZs.

DMZ

Southwest of the DMZ, an RT [CCN70-13-06-RT ??] reported that an unknown size enemy force was attempting to surround them. Two five man elements approached their position from the north and west, but the team evaded to the east where they were extracted without incident. On 3 September, two BORDEN agents [CCN70-13-07-RT ??] were parachuted into the area carrying homemade chemical time bursters to be emplaced in the bung of a POL barrel. They also had instructions to notional teams for the destruction of POL facilities. Collateral information indicated that the agents were captured within 12 hours of insert and that NVA security forces were subsequently alerted to guard against C-130 parachute insertions under the cover of leaflet drops.

No teams were inserted in the DMZ. FAC debriefs and VR missions indicated that the major routes were being repaired, and bulldozers and work parties were sighted on Route 1032B. The roads were fairly dry, and most of the interdiction points appeared open.

Wrap-Up: 24 September-9 October [CCN70-14]

BAs 607/611

Jamming was experienced by an RT [CCN70-14-01-RT ??] in BA 611 on both the emergency UHF frequency and the FM frequency. Two other teams [CCN70-14-02-RT ??], [CCN70-14-03-RT ??] by passed unknown sized enemy forces and were extracted under light small arms fire. A fourth team [CCN70-14-04-RT ??] experienced enemy radio operators attempting to contact the team using the SUGAR LOAF Radio Relay Site Call Sign.

In BA 611, one team [CCN70-14-05-RT FL] reported that they had enemy movement on three sides. The two US team members and 2 SCU were shot and were listed as missing. One Al-H aircraft supporting the extraction crashed in South Vietnam. North of BA 611, another team was engaged by 10-15 enemy, but was safely extracted. On 24 September, during an insert of a US-led RT [CCN70-14-06-RT ??], an enemy transmission was monitored which stated "The Americans have landed." The team was immediately extracted and reinserted on another hill. The team found several small caches, US concertina wire, and bunkers. One SCU team member stated that he was in the 33rd Laotian Battalion at Lao Bao in 1967 during the Khe Sanh Operation and was stationed on this hill with three platoons. He showed the team that the entire hill top was mined, and the team was extracted when the SCU refused to move off the hill.

DMZ

Southwest of the DMZ, two road-watch teams on Route 925 heard heavy vehicles moving in both directions on the road. One ARVN [CCN70-14-07-AT ??] and one US team [CCN70-14-08-RT ??] were confronted with unknown sized enemy forces and extracted under small arms fire. In the DMZ three teams made contact with enemy forces, although no significant enemy sightings were noted.

Analysis..

During the 3rd quarter of 1970, 74 teams were inserted into the northern PFAO. Two out of three teams experienced significant enemy contact at some time during the conduct of the mission. The NVA/VC had obviously intensified its counter-reconnaissance activities in the DMZ and more noticeably in the northern PFAO west and southwest of the DMZ. Reconnaissance teams experienced an increasing number of enemy tracking units, many with dogs. The NVA was also apparently making a concerted effort to monitor and occasionally jam team radio frequencies. Although these expended efforts were apparent, they did not interfere with team operations to any appreciable degree. One hundred and sixty-five intelligence reports were submitted as a direct result of these reconnaissance operations which confirmed the fact that the enemy had developed a relatively sophisticated rear area security system.

Wrap-Up: 10-23 October [CCN70-15]

BAs 607/611

A team [CCN70-15-01-RT CO?] was inserted and extracted on 23 October after contact was made with an estimated enemy squad. One SCU was KIA and there were unknown enemy casualties. North of BA 611, a team [CCN70-15-02-RT ??] spent only 39 minutes on the ground and engaged the enemy twice.

DMZ

On 10 October, a team [CCN70-15-03-RT ??] made two attempts to insert west of the DZ, but was prevented because of grass and brush fires caused by the suppressing gun support. An insertion was made on the third attempt and a radio transmission was monitored in North Vietnamese. It said "The team just landed, everybody move up." The supporting helicopter immediately returned to the LZ and extracted the team without incident. During the extraction, a second transmission was monitored, which stated, "The team is going back, everybody stay alert." A second team [CCN70-15-04-RT ??] was inserted on 13 October and was on the ground for five hours. The team could not move because of the extensive enemy activity in their immediate vicinity. A third insertion on the 14th was hindered by two SCU being injured upon insertion. The team subsequently extracted without incident. A fourth insertion [CCN70-15-05-RT ?CO?] resulted in contact with an estimated enemy squad on 23 October. Prior to extraction, two A-1s and an OV-10 armed FAC expended in support of the team.

In another target area, a team [CCN70-15-06-RT ??] was inserted without incident on 18 October. The team made contact the following day with four enemy, resulting in one injured SCU and unknown enemy casualties. The team attempted to extract only the wounded SCU, but an estimated five enemy advanced on the team and everyone was extracted.

In the DMZ, one team [CCN70-15-07-RT ??] was active from 14 to 17 October and reported extensive enemy movement. Another team [CCN70-15-08-RT ??] attempted a walk-in on 22 October from an LZ that was secured by the ARVN. On the 23rd, contact was made with an unknown size enemy force, and the team was extracted by helicopter.

JPRC

On 23 October, the Chief of Staff approved OPLAN 201, "BRIGHT LIGHT," which prescribed an operational concept for recovery of US and Free World Military Assistance Forces. This new plan was drawn up because the rescue and recovery of PWs had met with little noticeable success. The plan outlined general considerations for recovery and indicated some of the enemy tactics.

Wrap-Up: 24 October-18 November [CCN70-16]

SUGAR LOAF

SUGARLOAF Radio Site was closed on 4 November because of the Northeast Monsoon. This caused a concurrent reduction of insertions into the surrounding area.

BA 611

On 13 November, after seven days in its target area, an RT [CCN70-16-01-RT ??] encountered three enemy. There were no casualties. Later the same day, an NVA squad fired at the team with AK-47s, and the team called for TAC AIR. Enemy casualties were unknown. The team was then extracted under automatic and small arms fire.

Another team [CCN70-16-02-RT ?OH?] noted extensive enemy movement in its area and requested that an exploitation platoon [CCN70-16-03-HF CoA] be inserted to possibly intercept the enemy force. The platoon engaged enemy forces on four separate occasions, suffered light casualties, and requested air support. The 101st Airborne Div reported 37 KBA. The RT was extracted on 7 November; the platoon was extracted on 9 November under intense enemy ground fire.

DMZ

Enemy movements west of the DMZ increased. An estimated twenty-five enemy engaged one team [CCN70-16-04-RT ?Rice?] during an extraction on 24 October and a UH-1H was lost. Another team was on the ground only thirty-five minutes before being hit by about ten NVA. On 8 November, a team [CCN70-16-05-RT ??] made contact with an NVA squad and was extracted. On 14 November, a team [CCN70-16-06-RT AN] encountered an estimated 30-40 NVA troops. An emergency was called, but the team was unable to contact anyone. One US team member [SGT LP Allen] was KIA; seven members were WIA. The team was extracted after a second encounter with the NVA.

In the DMZ, a US-led trailwatch team [CCN70-16-07-RT ??] heard movement of approximately six tracker personnel about 20 meters southwest of their location on 24 October. Shortly after seven hours on the ground, the team declared a tactical emergency, and was extracted without incident. A second team [CCN70-16-08-RT ??] was inserted on 3 November into this same area and reported no enemy activity for eight days. Four other teams reported some enemy movements, but nothing significant.

Wrap-Up: 19 November-11 December [CCN70-17]

BA 614

On 28 November, a US-led RT, [CCN70-17-01-HT FL] composed of three US and three SCU were HALO-dropped into the area at 0200 hours. Although the weather was extremely poor and the team became separated, the mission was considered successful. See Appendix VIII for further details.

BAs 607/611

On 6 December, west of BA 607, an RT [CCN70-17-02-RT ??] was extracted after spending thirty-two minutes on the ground. Twelve NVA affronted the team ten minutes after landing; three NVA were KIA.

In BA 611, an RT [CCN70-17-03-RT ??] made contact with the NVA twice in three hours and fifteen minutes on the ground and was extracted under extensive small arms fire on 23 November.

DMZ

7th Air Force requested an investigation of Ban Seu Doun Village, and a US-led platoon [CCN70-17-04-RT CoA] was inserted on 20 November; the village was uninhabited. On 24 November, the platoon reported that it was surrounded by an unknown size enemy force with one US KIA [SSG MI Arbeit], one US WIA [SSG JA Whitener], and one SCU WIA. At 1500 hours, the KIA and WIA were extracted by helicopter while under intense small arms fire. A second UH-1H helicopter, while attempting the extraction of remaining platoon members struck a tree and crashed in the vicinity of the LZ. VNAF A-1s and helicopter gunships provided effective suppressive fires and after a successful extraction of the platoon and crew, destroyed the downed aircraft. The pilots of these aircraft estimated that four to six platoons, in three separate positions, provided anti-aircraft and supporting fire for two enemy assault platoons attacking the US forces. All three supporting positions were engaged by the Cobra gunships and A-1 aircraft. The composite BDA for all A-1 and Cobra gunships was 75 enemy killed, possibly 75 to 100 more enemy KBA, and three automatic weapons positions destroyed.

Wrap-Up: 12-31 December [CCN70-18]

BA 611

On 17 December, a team [CCN70-18-01-RT ??] observed six enemy and heard additional movement. The team evaded, using rockets fired by a FAC to support its evasion. The team was extracted after spending only twenty-one minutes on the ground. Another mission [CCN70-18-02-RT ??] was aborted the same day when the lead helicopter received ground fire from the vicinity of the intended LZ. On 18 December, another team [CCN70-18-03-RT ??] observed a file of four enemy troops followed by another six further behind. The RT attacked and killed the first four. The other six were fired upon with unknown results. The team then called for extraction and was lifted out with no further incidents.

DMZ

A US-led RT [CCN70-18-04-RT ??] found a company size bivouac area right after insertion on 13 December. A couple of hours later, the team heard movement around their position and began transmitting an emergency distress signal on its URC-68 radio. At the same time, the team heard the emergency signal being received on another radio approximately 30 meters to the east. The team continued to hear movement and whistles and helicopter gunships were directed against the suspected enemy positions. All activity ceased, and the team was extracted without further incident. An ARVN-led RT [CCN70-18-05-AT ??] was engaged by an unknown size enemy force in an LZ on 16 December. One UH-1H helicopter crew member was KIA, and two helicopter gunships were directed against the enemy positions forcing the enemy to break contact. The team was extracted after only 18 minutes on the ground. Another RT [CCN70-18-06-RT ??] was extracted under heavy small arms fire after three hours on the ground. On 23 December, an ARVN-led team [CCN70-18-07-AT ??] made contact with an unknown size enemy force after three days. The team was then extracted under heavy small arms fire, while four helicopter gunships were directed against the enemy positions.

On 26 December, after four days in its target area, an ARVN-led RT [CCN70-18-08-AT ??] heard an estimated 10 enemy moving approximately 30 meters to its northwest. At this time, the team also heard a previously implanted M-14 mine explode, and several of the enemy started yelling. Later, the team engaged an enemy squad, resulting in no friendly and unknown enemy casualties, and was then extracted without incident. A US-led RT [CCN70-18-09-RT ??] was able to spend only two hours and thirty minutes in its target area on 27 December. The team heard enemy activity 125 meters northwest of the LZ, and was extracted after directing two helicopter gunships against the enemy positions.

SOG operations in the northern PFAO and the DMZ were at a low level due to the weather. However, reports continued to show increasing enemy activity. In the area just north of BAs 609 and 613, RTs were reasonably successful, even though enemy reaction increased. MACSOG/STD teams continued to locate base camps, bivouac areas, caches and communication wires with increasing frequency. The enemy continued preparations for an influx of personnel and supplies in the coming dry season.

Recapitulation

Extensive statistics for MACSOG operations are provided in the supporting Appendices, however a short recap is presented below to provide an insight into the scope of SALEM HOUSE and PRAIRIE FIRE activities.

Table 3

1970 RT ACTIVITIES RECAP

ACTIVITY

PRAIRIE FIRE/DMZ

Number of Inserts

491

Enemy KIA (Counted/Estimated)

490/701

Operational Days

1,770

If you were involved in any such operations and wish to contribute to the details of what went occurred, join the discussion at the appropriate Green Beret Forum (linked below). If you have photographs, you can add a weblink to an image (or any) URL to the forum, but when I get around to pulling this off to a CD version, I will need to call upon you to get a hi-res version. Do NOT send the high res or even copies of the pictures to me at this time. I have divided the forum up in to several threads by Calendar Year. Title your discussion entry by the reference number of the operation you wish to chime in on. Make separate entires for different operations. If the guides that I provide don't help you identify the operation, come as close as you can. This is an experiment to recreate the after action reports for these operations (which, as far as we can tell do not exist). Let's see how well the internet serves to accomplish this task.

Chronologies of Operations:

List of Operations Discussion of Specific Operations
[C&C (Danang) 1965-1966 (Shining Brass)] [Discussion]
[CCN 1967-1968 (Shining Brass)] [Discussion]
[CCN - 1969 (Prairie Fire)] not yet details are available [Discussion]
[CCN - 1970 (Prairie Fire)] [Discussion]
[CCN/TF1AE - 1971-1972 (Phu Dung)] [Discussion]
[Aviation Support For All of the Above] To add to the narrative discussion, use theappropriate chronological category above

[CCN Discussion Forum]
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